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Certain dicta, appearing recently in the YALE LAW JOURNAL' appear
to me to invite a few comments. A discussion as to the appropriate-
ness of the term "legal evolution" requires a preliminary indication
of the terms "law" and "evolution" since both are used in ordinary
speech in very different senses. In The Austinian Theory of Law,
2
I define "law" as the organic totality of the rules relating to external
human action, together with the associated systems of rights and duties
which those rules imply, affirmed by the State through official organs,
maintained by the organized power of the State, and applied by the
courts of the State in the discharge of their judicial functions. The
definition assumes the validity of certain arguments amplified in the
preceding pages. For present purposes, it is perhaps sufficient to say
that I understand the term "law" to mean a system of rules of con-
duct as enforced in courts of justice. The word "system" connotes
here an organic or quasi-organic interrelation of parts. Whatever a
lawyer may say when he is theorizing, he recognizes in actual practice
this interrelation. It is more necessary, perhaps, to dwell on the fact
that, since law is what courts enforce, a distinction exists between the
ostensible and the real law. A judge may give a decision, purporting
to be declaratory as regards the relation between law and a particular
group of circumstances, and possibly establishing, by authority of
precedent, a rule of law. A legislature enacts a statute. Both the
language of judges and the text of a statute are ostensible law. To
speak of an act of the legislature as ostensible law may seem a con-
tempt of the "High Court of Parliament," but it is a recognition of
the fact that what the legislature enacts, judges interpret. The soci-
ologist may say that a statute is an expression of a general will; the
lawyer is bound to say that the law is as the judges decide. He knows
from practical experience that the metamorphoses which take place
in the process of applying an enactment to the infinitely varying groups
of facts, are such as to warrant the statement that the enactment is
but ostensible law. I take this as not negativing the view of law as
State ordained. The judge is an organ of the State. Before any
judicial interpretation has been given a citizen may follow rules of
conduct deemed to be in harmony with statutory texts, with varying
'Judge Gager's REVIEW of Formative Influences of Legal Development in
(1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 617; and Professor Keller, Law in Evolution
(1919) 28 ibid., 769.
'Brown, The Austinian Theory of Law (19o6) 354.
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degrees of certitude according to the circumstances of the case. The
statute binds before it is judicially interpreted; but what the statute
means or does may be on the lap of the Gods. To distinguish between
law and the interpretation of law, though permissible for certain pur-
poses as a short way of saying things, invites confusion between the
ostensible law and the real law, since it is textual fornmulation as inter-
preted which constitutes law, whether for scientific or for practical
purposes. We may protest against the occasionally excessive sub-
jectivity in the processes of judicial interpretation without shutting our
eyes to the fact that an element of subjectivity necessarily exists.
Bishop Hoadley was only guilty of a pardonable exaggeration when
he declared that it did not matter so much who made the law as who
interpreted it. When a solicitor advises his client that an action will
not succeed he is predicting what view judges are likely to take. He
does not know; he anticipates with varying degrees of certitude. The
result may be unfortunate from the point of view of the law student in
search of finalities. To others than students of law, it is disagreeable
to substitute the indefinite for a definite quantity. But it is better to
recognize an element of indefiniteness than to perpetuate a fiction.
When a judge says, "This text is the law; I have only to apply it,"
he should be taken in all charity to mean, "This text is the declared
law; and my duty. is to interpret and apply it to the circumstances
before me." Given certain facts, the interpretation and application
may at times be more or less mechanical. If we take a wider view,
and especially if we regard law as a whole, even the most authoritative
texts (legal principle or rule) will be found to have a degree of elas-
ticity as it is interpreted and applied. If we shirk this plain fact we
abide on the surface of things. If we accept the fact we have to
recognize that law, as the resultant of forces of which the mind of
accredited interpreters is one, must necessarily change from generation
to generation, however stereotyped in form may be what is popularly
called law. The rate of change varies with circumstances of time and
place; the change may be so slow as not to be apparent; but it takes
place.
The suggested analogy between law and a pile of bricks is palpably
false to reality for two reasons. In the first place, the analogy implic-
itly ignores the distinction between formulated texts and the law. In
the second place, even if the term "law" were limited to formulated
texts, the fact would remain that additions to those texts are affected
by, and react upon, the character and meaning of pre-existing texts.
For example, the actual rules which govern the life of the citizen, in
so far as legal relations fall within the ambit of a particular statute, are
determined both by the organic or quasi-organic intetrelation of a
totality of statutes and precedents, and by the mental attitude of
judges who bring to the statute an equipment derived from the history
of the race and the environment of a particular generation. We may
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say, if we like, that the statute remains fixed without any tendency to
change or develop. As a matter of fact, however, the statute does not
mean-cannot mean-to one generation just what it meant to a pre-
ceding generation.
The question whether legal change is of a kind to justify the use of
the term "legal evolution" is another matter, and calls for some indi-
cation of the meaning of the word "evolution." The "theory of evo-
lution" has varied from time to time. But I think we may fairly use
the term "evolution" to indicate a process by which a result is arrived
at, not by "special creation" but by the survival of types best fitted
to survive under the conditions of a particular if changing milieu.
Variations in offspring are postulated. The variation may even
approximate to (or be) a mutation. But the character of the process
may be illustrated by saying, for example, that man was not created
de novo in a Garden of Eden, but is the product of a long process,
extending over an indefinite period, in the course of which there were
many stages, much conflict between pre-human species and individuals,
and a general trend or tendency towards the survival of the fittest.
The fittest may or may not be more complex in form. The essential
things are adaptation to environment and a gradual but progressive
elimination of individuals or species least able to respond to the call
of circumstance.
Is there a tendency in law to develop? The answer may be in the
negative if we limit the term "law" to textual formulation. But if
we remember that statute and precedent alike have to be interpreted
as well as applied by successive generations of judges, we must con-
cede that there is in law a tendency, if not to develop, at any rate to
change. Assuming a tendency to change, the question of the direction
of the change, whether upward or downward, is irrelevant for the
purpose of considering the propriety of the use of the term "legal
evolution." Biological evolution implies change; but the change may
be upward or downward. The word "development" connotes an
upward tendency; but the evolution of life on earth is conditioned by
the call of circumstance. That call may be for higher or for lower
types according to the tests of complexity, heterogeneity, or any ethi-
cal standard which may chance to dominate the mind of the observer.
I presume that a jurist who speaks of "legal evolution" has not in
his mind the idea of a tendency in legal texts to wriggle uncannily as
if possessed of the Devil. They are possessed, however-possessed
of man. A judge who determines to give to an ancient text its precise
ancient meaning strives after the impossible because he would be other
than human, if he could approach the ancient text with precisely the
same mental attitude and equipment as the judge of an ancient genera-
tion. The weight of the dead hand has to be recognized; but it cannot
be regarded as if it were the sole factor in a product to which the
mind of successive generations contributes. When the legislature
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passes a new statute it works, consciously or unconsciously, on old
material as envisaged in the light of a new generation. Again, when
the statute is passed, it cannot be interpreted otherwise than in some
relation, however imperfect or unconscious, (ideally in organic rela-
tion), to the totality of law. Even if a legislature enacts a "complete
code," the formulation and interpretation of the code are conditioned
by the environment and history of the people. Neither the legislature
nor the judge can escape the influence of environment. Some bad
decisions, many bad statutes, suggest a futile attempt at "special crea-
tion." Variations may be made; the variation may approximate to
a mutation. The dead hand of the past cannot be wholly eluded any
more than an element of subjectivity in the mind of the judge. "The
forms of action rule us from the grave." I may presume to add, "sub
modo."
The more obvious difference between the processes of legal change
and of biological evolution is that in biological evolution the range of
influence of what are sometimes called "the blind forces of nature"
is more ap parent. The difference, for what it is worth, should be
recognized. Professor Keller says, speaking of adjustment,
"Adjustment may be mental without being deliberate, purposeful,
rational, or even conscious. Folkways are empirical, not planful.




The learned writer appears to me to underrate, rather than exaggerate,
the importance of the element of purpose in legal change. The inabil-
ity to give a rational excuse for a variation or adjustment is no proof
of the absence of a reason or purpose for the variation or adjustment.
The end may be too dimly conceived to be expressed by the individual,
or a society, which makes an adjustment. A man may be able to
whistle, and yet have a tune in his head that he cannot even whistle.
Business men do things; they achieve; they arrive-often without
being able to give any intelligent account of their success, even to
themselves. It is well known that Sir Joshua Reynolds' book on
Painting' offers little or no guidance to those who wish to become
famous painters. Books on literary styles are notoriously lacking,
speaking as a rule, in practical utility. Many other exampleg might
be quoted. They serve to illustrate, not a lack of purpose, but the limi-
tations of the human mind to express purpose.
The question arises whether this difference between legal change and
biological evolution, to the extent that it exists, goes so far to the root
of the matter as to make the use of the term "legal evolution" objec-
tionable. To answer this question is difficult because of the varieties
'Keller, ibid., 775.
' Reynolds, Discourses on Painting (1825).
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of opinion expressed or held by exponents of "the theory of biological
evolution." Some admit, some deny, mutation. I am not certain to
what extent present day exponents of biological evolution would
exclude from the concept of evolution the breeding of animals in an
environment where one of the factors of the process is the mind of the
breeder. But, supposing this factor to be excluded, the possibility of
all superhuman supervision of biological evolution is not necessarily
excluded. Again, when we speak of the evolution of a particular
species, there is not excluded the possibility of mental or quasi-mental
processes in the course of adjustment to environment. If the fittest
survive, the result is not invariably due to extraneous causes. Inter
alia, sex selection operates. My conclusion is that the existence and
degree of the element of purpose in legal change are not, per se, an
answer to the appropriateness of the use of the term "legal evolution."
All that we are justified in saying is that in the case of law conscious,
if unformulated, purposes play a more important and a more apparent
r6le than in biological evolution. This would only amount to saying
that "legal evolution" is evolution of a particular character, if it be
conceded that legal change exhibits the processes which constitute the
stock in trade of the evolutionist in biology.
I am in agreement with those who speak of the "evolution of law."
I find in legal history an inevitable tendency to change, a continuing
adjustment to environment, and a process of survival of the fittest,
in the course of which the rules of human conduct less fitted to a
particular milieu are squeezed out of existence and give way to rules
best fitted for that milieu. Tradition may be substituted for heredity,
and the element of purpose (whether expressed by legislators or
applied by judges) may be more potent and apparent in the processes
of change. Such differences do not preclude an analogy between
legal history and biological evolution. True, formulated texts of law
are not "red in tooth and claw." But without dwelling too much on
the exaggerated respect paid in the past to this aspect of biological
evolution, there is an increasing "conflict of laws" in a sense other
than that consecrated by usage. In any case, I do not presume to say
that every exponent of what is called the "theory of evolution" should
accept the conclusion I have indicated. The "theory of evolution"
means such different things to different authorities that I am driven
to dwell in the realm of what I may call the lowest common measure.
Subject to this understanding, I think the term "legal evolution" a
useful and suggestive way of expressing some of the most funda-
mental characteristics of the long process involved in the history of
law. A novel statute or precedent suggests to my mind variation
(purposeful, perhaps, but still variation) in a general flow of things in
which there is a continuing response to the call of circumstance-
adjustment to environment. The nature of the process is apt to be
observed by that lack of perspective which prevents us from seeing
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the old and the new in their true relation. The legislator is not, as he
may imagine himself, a Columbus. Not infrequently, he is merely
making explicit what was really implicit in pre-existing law. When,
however, he perpetuates a variation, the survival of the variation, as
in biology, awaits the tests of time and circumstance.
I have but one more comment to make. Judge Gager writes:
"The only active element causing change lies, not in law itself, but in
the action of the human mind, creating, modifying, discarding ideas of
that class collectively dominated law."5
I quote this sentence because it might be taken to suggest that the
mind working on legal texts is the mind actively responsible for legal
change. Normally, change in law may be the result of the conception
of an end more or less dimly conceived by those whose laws are under
consideration. But I feel bound to ask the question whether change in
law invariably takes place in the way suggested. Some indirect
results of the intrusion of an alien race, or of alien ideas, a catastrophe
in nature, or the purposeless incidentals of a revolution in the social
order, may effect legal changes in ways which, from the point of view
of process, are suggestive of biological changes due to those "blind
forces of nature" upon which some exponents of the "theory of evo-
lution" lay so much emphasis when they object to the use of the term
"evolution" in the realm of sociology.
Assuming the foregoing conclusions together with their implica-
tions to be sound, the question naturally arises as to their importance
for the "practical" lawyer. Some will answer, "None at all." To
the lawyer striving to understand and to interpret existing texts by the
aid of the apparatus of ideas which modern thought provides, the
answer will be otherwise. Fortunately, we build better than we
know; and the lawyer who prides himself upon his adherence to
forms, texts, and the ostensible generally, is often not so "practical,"
in the invidious sense of the term, as he imagines himself to be. So
also of the judges, though with regard to the latter it may be well on
occasion that an advocate should choose his language wisely. Some
judges, who would listen with complacency to a learned argument
based on assumptions about legal growth, would be instantly ruffled
if the term "legal evolution" were used. An august tribunal, which
some years ago gave evidence of being shocked by a reference to the
concept of the jiuristic person shortly after gave judicial approval to
the expression "the brains of the corporation." I even think, if I
remember aright, that the learned judges talked with freedom of the
head and the seat of a corporation! The really practical lawyer will
employ his scientific equipment to aid him in arriving at sound conclu-
sions, but will express these conclusions with due regard to judicial
' Gager, ibid., 6z8.
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infirmities! A learned judge once protested to me in private against
certain views expressed or implicit in this article. A reference to his
note books, however, revealed an accumulation of decisions in which
what I had said expressly had been tacitly, if unconsciously, assumed.
The ancient fiction that judges never added to, but only applied, pre-
existing law, has been long since discredited. There are still judges,
however, who cherish the fiction that a statutory text or a legal prin-
ciple or rule may have all the certitude and inelasticity of a mathe-
matical proposition or chemical formula. When a lawyer pleads
before such a judge his method of approach will be flank rather than
frontal. The tact required of the judge is proverbial. But what of
the tact required of the advocate who lives in an age of seemingly
rapid transition, and in a world where thought dwelleth not in water-
tight compartments !
